State v. Hoak Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 34906 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
1-28-2009
State v. Hoak Respondent's Brief Dckt. 34906
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Hoak Respondent's Brief Dckt. 34906" (2009). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 1770.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/1770
LAW CLERK 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 
1 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) NO. 34906 
vs. 
LARRY MATTHEW HOAK, 
Defendant-Appelant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF ADA 
HONORABLE CHERl C. COPSEY 
District Judge 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN 
Attorney General Deputy State Appellate 
State of Idaho Public Defender 
3W7--take Harbor Lane 
STEPHEN A. BYWATER Boise, Idaho 83703 
Deputy Attorney General (208) 334-2712 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
JESSICA M. LORELLO 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ldaho 83720-001 0 
(208) 334-4534 
ATTORNEYS FOR 
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
ATTORNEY FOR 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
1 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDA% 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Copy 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF ADA 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) NO. 34906 
vs . 1 
) 
LARRY MATTHEW HOAK, ) 
HONORABLE CHERl C. COPSEY 
District Judge 
LAWRENCE G; WASDEN ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN 
Attorney General Deputy State Appellate 
State of Idaho Public Defender 
3647 Lake Harbor Lane 
STEPHEN A. BYWATER Boise, Idaho 83703 
Deputy Attorney General (208) 334-271 2 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
JESSICA M. LORELLO 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ldaho 83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
ATTORNEYS FOR 
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
ATTORNEY FOR 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................................................... ii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......................................................................... I 
Nature Of The Case .............................................................................. I
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The 
Criminal Proceedings ............................................................................ I 
ISSUE ....................... .. ........................................................................... 5 
ARGUMENT .................................................................................................. 6
Hoak Has Failed To Establish The District Court Erred In 
Admitting Evidence Of His Prior Conduct In Order To 
Establish His Stalking Behavior Would Cause A Reasonable 
Person Substantial Emotional Distress ............................................... 6 
A. Introduction ................................................................................. 6 
B. Standard Of Review .................... ........................................... 6 
C. Evidence Of Hoak's Prior Conduct Was Not 
. . .  
...................................................................... Unduly Prejudrcial 7 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................... 12
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ............ . ......................................................... 13
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES PAGE 
................................................................... Greer v . Miller. 483 U.S. 756 (1 987) 10 
......................... . . State v . Atkinson. 124 Idaho 816. 864 P.2d 654 (Ct App 1993) 6 
. ............................ State v . Lippert. 145 Idaho 586. 181 P.3d 512 (Ct App . 2007) 9 
........................... . . State v . McGuire. 135 Idaho 535. 20 P.3d 719 (Ct App 2001) 7 
. ......................... State v . Winkler. 112 Idaho 917. 736 P.2d 1371 (Ct . App 1987) 7 
. ............................ United Statesv . Daniels. 770 F.2d 1111 (D.C. Cir 1985) 11. 12 
STATUTES 
I.C. 3 18-918 ...................................................................................................... 2
I . C. 3 18-7906 .................................................................................................. 6. 9 
RULES 
I.R.E. 402 ............................................................................................................. 7 
I.R.E. 403 ....................................................................................................... 3, 7 
......................................................................................................... I.R.E.404 2, 3
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Larry Matthew Hoak appeals from the judgment entered upon a jury 
verdict finding him guilty of felony stalking and being a persistent violator, 
challenging the admission of certain evidence offered to prove Hoak's course of 
conduct would cause a reasonable person substantial emotional distress. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Criminal Proceedings 
Hoak verbally and physically abused his girlfriend, Kathy Hendricks, over 
several months. (See generally Trial Tr., pp.118-298 (victim's testimony 
regarding physical abuse and threats including threats to cut her legs off and 
threats to burn her house down with her in it; Exhibits 1A - 1C (pictures of 
bruises).) Hoak continued to contact and threaten Kathy while he was 
incarcerated for incidents involving Kathy and despite the existence of a no 
contact order. (Trial Tr., p.134, L.13 -p.135, L.7, p.168, L.7-p.171, L.14, 
p.366, L.17 - p.367, L.21, p.367, L.22 - p.377, L.7; Exhibits 2-7, 9-13.) During 
one period of incarceration, after Kathy had broken up with Hoak, Hoak wrote 
several letters to Kathy. (Trial Tr., p.193, L.22 - p.255, L.4; Exhibits 2-7, 9) In 
one letter, Hoak referenced a prior threat in which he told Kathy he was going to 
cut her head off. (Trial Tr., p.219, L.17 - p.220, L.17; Exhibit 4.) Hoak also 
made numerous attempts to contact Kathy by telephone, including attempts 
through third parties since Kathy had her home phone number changed. (Trial 
TF., p.194, Ls.19-25, p.243, L.3 - p.244, L.23, p.246, L.24 - p.247, L.24, pp.302, 
314-319, 332-334; Exhibits 16, 17.) 
As a result of Hoak's behavior, the state charged him with felony stalking. 
(R., Vol. I, pp.29-30.) The state specifically alleged Hoak committed felony 
stalking by: 
[Rlepeatedly writing letters to Kathryn Hendricks and sending them 
through third parties, by calling Kathryn Hendricks through a third 
party, andlor by causing her phone to ring repeatedly or 
continuously regardless of whether a conversation ensued and 
where the Defendant's actions constituting the offense are in 
violation of a no contact order in Ada County Case Number 
M0600110 andlor the Defendant has previously been convicted of 
Domestic Battery, I.C. 518-918, involving the same victim as the 
present offense within seven (7) years notwithstanding the form of 
the judgment or withheld judgment. 
(R., Vol. I, pp.29-30.) 
The state also filed an Information Part II alleging Hoak is a persistent 
violator. (R., Vol. I, pp.119-20, 151 -53.) 
Prior to trial, the state filed a notice of intent to introduce evidence 
pursuant to I.R.E. 404(b). (R., Vol. I, pp.61-62.) In that notice, the state 
identified the "general nature of the evidence" as (1) statements by Kathy 
regarding Hoak's "prior threats on her life and well being;" (2) statements 
"regarding past reported and unreported physical abuse;" (3) statements 
"regarding the methods in which [Hoak] violated past no contact orders;" (4) 
statements "regarding prior No Contact Order Violations which were dismissed or 
unreported;" (5) "Judgments of Conviction of prior No Contact Order violations 
and crimes committed against Kathy Hendricks under Chapter 18 Title 9 of the 
Idaho Code;" and (6) "statements by Kathy Hendricks regarding verbal abuse, 
forced sex, and property damage inflicted by" Hoak. (R., Vol. I, pp.61-62.) The 
state filed a memorandum in support of its 404(b) notice further elaborating on 
the evidence it intended to present. (R., Vol. I, pp.63-82.) 
Hoak filed an objection, arguing that "any events that occurred or are 
alleged to have occurred outside of th[e] time frame [alleged in the indictment] 
are irrelevant." (R., Voi. I, p.98.) Hoak also objected on the grounds that 
admission of the evidence would (1) violate I.R.E. 403 because it would "paint 
[Hoak] with a broad brush as a previously convicted criminal and a violent 
person," and (2) violate I.R.E. 404(b) because, he claimed, none of the evidence 
satisfied the "specific exceptions described in Rule 404(b)." (R., Vol. I, pp.98- 
107.) 
The district court ultimately determined the majority of Hoak's prior 
conduct was admissible to demonstrate why the incidents underlying the stalking 
charge would cause a reasonable person substantial emotional distress, which is 
an element of the crime. (Trial Tr., p.46, L.3 - p.47, L.4, p.49, L.?3 - p.51, L.l, 
p.54, L.17 - p.58, L.9.) The court, however, precluded evidence of the fact of 
Hoak's prior convictions in the state's case in chief. (Trial Tr., p.66, L.13 - p.67, 
L.15.) The court also gave several limiting instructions regarding the limited 
purpose for which the "prior bad act" evidence could be considered. (Trial Tr., 
p.131, Ls.17-22, p.195, L.20 - p.196, L.5, p.529, L.19 - p.530, L.8; Jury 
Instruction No. 20.) . 
A jury convicted Hoak of felony stalking and of being a persistent violator. 
(R., Vol. 11, pp.216-18.) The court imposed a unified life sentence with ten years 
fixed. (R., Vol. II, pp.244-46, 272-74.) Hoak timely appealed. (R., Vol. 11, 
pp.250-52.) 
ISSUE 
Hoak states the issue' on appeal as: 
Did the district court err by admitting testimony regarding prior bad 
acts of Mr. Hoak because their probative value, individually, or 
viewed cumulatively, was substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.4.) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
Has Hoak failed to establish error in the admission of evidence offered to prove 
Hoak's course of conduct would cause a reasonable person substantial 
emotional distress? 
' In addition to the Appellant's Brief filed by counsel, Hoak filed a pro se 
"Supplement Brief." Hoak has not, however, obtained permission to do so. The 
state, therefore, will not respond to the issues raised therein at this time. 
ARGUMENT 
Hoak Has Failed To Establish The District Court Erred In Admittinq Evidence Of 
His Prior Conduct In Order To Establish His Stalkina Behavior Would Cause A 
Reasonable Person Substantial Emotional Distress 
A. Introduction 
During trial the district court permitted the state to present evidence of 
Hoak's prior conduct toward the victim in order to place his stalking behavior in 
context and establish that Hoak's stalking behavior would cause a reasonable 
person substantial emotional distress, as required by the stalking statute, I.C. 3 
18-7906. On appeal, Hoak challenges only the district court's determination that 
the probative value of Hoak's prior conduct was not substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice. (Appellant's Brief, p.10.) Specifically, Hoak 
argues that although "some" of Hoak's prior conduct was "probative," it was 
unduly prejudicial due to its "sheer volume, nature, and degree." (Appellant's 
Brief, p.11.) Hoak's argument fails on the law and the facts. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Whether evidence is relevant is a question of law reviewed de novo. 
State v. Atkinson, 124 Idaho 816, 819, 864 P.2d 654, 657 (Ct. App. 1993) 
(citations omitted). However, the abuse of discretion standard applies to the 
district court's determination that the probative value of the evidence is not 
substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. 
C. Evidence Of Hoak's Prior Conduct Was Not Undulv Preiudicial 
Evidence is admissible if it is relevant so long as it is not unduly prejudicial 
or otherwise subject to exclusion. I.R.E. 402, 403. On appeal, Hoak does not 
challenge the district court's determination that evidence of his prior conduct was 
relevant, but instead argues only that the district court abused its discretion when 
it determined the probative value of the evidence was not substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. (Appellant's Brief, p.10 ("It is the 
second prong of the analysis that is at issue for this Court.").) Although Hoak 
"admit[s] some of [the] history of his relationship with Ms. Hendricks was 
probative in assisting the jury to determine whether [he] was acting 'maliciously 
and knowingly' and whether his course of conduct would case a reasonable 
person substantial emotional distress," he claims the district court erred in its 
prejudice analysis because, he asserts, "the sheer volume, nature, and degree of 
the prior bad acts is sufficient to 'rouse the jury to overmastering hostility."' 
(Appellant's Brief, p.11 (quoting State v. Winkler, 112 ldaho 917, 736 P.2d 1371 
(Ct. App. 1987).) Thus, Hoak concludes, "the district court erred in permitting the 
state to introduce any evidence of [his] prior bad acts." (Appellant's Brief, p.14 
(emphasis added).) Hoak's argument fails as a matter of law. 
In determining whether relevant evidence should be excluded as unduly 
prejudicial, the "trial court's inquiry focuses on the unfairness of that prejudice." 
State v. McGuire, 135 ldaho 535, 540, 20 P.3d 719, 724 (Ct. App. 2001) (citation 
omitted). It is not enough that the evidence is merely prejudicial since "most 
probative evidence offered by the state in a criminal prosecution" is prejudicial; 
rather, the inquiry is whether the unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the 
probative value of the evidence. Id. 
Although Hoak cites the correct legal standard applicable to a prejudice 
analysis, he fails to apply that standard and instead argues that even though 
"some" of his prior conduct was probative, none of it was admissible due to "the 
sheer volume, nature, and degree of the prior bad acts." (Appellant's Brief, 
pp.10-11, 14.) The state is unaware of any authority, and Hoak cites none, that 
supports the proposition that a// probative and relevant prior bad act evidence 
should be excluded as unduly prejudicial simply because there is too much of it. 
While I.R.E. 403 provides that relevant evidence may be excluded if it will result 
in the "needless presentation of cumulative evidence," this does not mean that no 
evidence may be presented whenever there is a possibility that there might be 
cumulative evidence. If Hoak believes that specific evidence should have been 
excluded because it was cumulative, he must identify that evidence and explain 
why it was needlessly cumulative. It is not enough for Hoak to simply block 
quote the prosecutor's opening statement (which is not evidence), and outline the 
victim's testimony, and then claim none of the evidence regarding Hoak's prior 
conduct was admissible on the grounds it was too voluminous or "massive and 
overwhelming." (Appellant's Brief, pp.5-14.) 
Even if this Court considers the cumulative effect of Hoak's prior bad acts, 
Hoak cannot establish error. In order to prove Hoak was guilty of stalking, the 
state had to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Hoak "knowingly and 
maliciously" "[e]ngage[d] in a course of conduct that seriously alarm[ed], 
annoy[ed] or harasse[d] [Kathy],'' and was such that it "would cause a reasonable 
person substantial emotional distress." I.C. 5 18-7906(l)(a). In determining that 
Hoak's prior conduct was not unduly prejudicial the district court recognized the 
issue as a matter of discretion, and acted within the bounds of that discretion, in 
concluding that evidence of Hoak's prior conduct was necessary to demonstrate 
why a reasonable person in Kathy's position would feel substantial emotional 
distress. (TrialTr., p.46, L.5-p.47, L.lO, p.50, Ls.16-25, p.55, L.12-p.57, L.5.) 
Hoak has failed to establish otherwise. & State v. Lippert, 145 Idaho 586, 591- 
92, 181 P.3d 512, 517-18 (Ct. App. 2007) (concluding the trial court did not err in 
admitting testimony on prior uncharged incidents of sexual misconduct because 
the evidence "demonstrated [his] sexual disposition toward the young females in 
his residence, which may not have been gleaned from evidence of any of the 
incidents individually," thus, "[tlhe cumulative effect was . . . highly probative of 
whether the charged conduct . . . was committed with the intent to satisfy his lust, 
passions or sexual desire.") 
The district court's analysis applied equally to the "allegations of rape and 
substantial physical injury," which Hoak complains should not have been 
admitted because those acts are "particularly damning." (Appellant's Brief, p.12.) 
Hoak's prior physical abuse and sexual assault of Kathy was highly probative on 
the issue of whether a reasonable person would suffer emotional distress as a 
result of stalking behavior that might otherwise seem harmless. That those 
particular acts may be "particularly damning" does not make them unduly 
prejudicial and the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding as 
much. 
Hoak also argues that although "it was proper and necessary to instruct 
the jury on how it could consider the prior bad act evidence, the limiting 
instruction was wholly insufficient to cure the improper introduction of the highly 
prejudicial and voluminous bad act evidence presented to the jury." (Appellant's 
Brief, p.14.) Hoak's argument fails because it is based on a misunderstanding of 
the purpose of the court's limiting instruction. The purpose of the district court's 
limiting instruction was obviously not to "cure the improper introduction" of Hoak's 
prior bad acts given the court's conclusion that the acts were admissible, i.e., not 
"improper[ly] introduc[ed]." Rather, the purpose was to "instruct the jury on how it 
could consider the prior bad act evidence" - a purpose Hoak acknowledges as 
"proper and necessary." (Appellant's Brief, p.14.) 
The cases Hoak relies on in support of his argument illustrate his 
misunderstanding of the law. In Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 766 n.8 (1987) 
(citations and quotations omitted, emphasis added), the United States Supreme 
Court did indeed state, as Hoak notes, that a reviewing court will "normally 
presume that a jury will follow an instruction to disregard inadmissible evidence 
inadvertently presented to it, unless there is an overwhelming probability that the 
jury will be unable to follow the court's instructions, and a strong likelihood that 
the effect of the evidence would be devastating to the defendant." (Appellant's 
Brief, p.15.) However, it is readily apparent that this presumption relates to 
curative instructions given when the trial court concludes evidence has been 
improperly admitted, not limiting instructions given in relation to properly admitted 
evidence. 
United States v. Daniels, 770 F.2d 11 11 (D.C. Cir. 1985), the other case 
upon which Hoak relies, is also inapplicable. Daniels was charged with "armed 
bank robbery, carrying a pistol without a license, and possession of a firearm 
subsequent to a felony conviction." Id. at 11 13-1 114. The trial court declined 
Daniel's request to sever the armed robbery and carrying a pistol without a 
license charges from the felon in possession of a firearm charge. Id. As a result, 
the jury heard evidence of Daniel's prior felony conviction, which was admitted to 
I prove the felon in possession charge, and which would have been inadmissible 
in relation to the armed robbery and carrying a pistol without a license charges 
Id. At issue on appeal was whether the district court erred in failing to sever due 
-
to the prejudice that may have resulted from the admission of Daniel's prior 
I 
conviction. Id. 
In analyzing Daniels' claim of error, the court noted, "There is a high risk of 
undue prejudice whenever, as in this case, joinder of counts allows evidence of 
other crimes to be introduced in a trial of charges with respect to which the 
evidence would otherwise be inadmissible." 770 F.2d at 1116. Thus. the 
problem "pose[dj" in Daniels was "the admissibility of a prior felony conviction 
because of joinder of an ex-felon offense," and the court's comments "concerning 
the efficacy of jury instructions in curing the prejudice caused by the introduction 
of other crimes evidence," were made in that context. 770 F.2d at 11 17-1 118 
Because Hoak's case involves a single charge and does not involve the 
admission of prior bad act evidence not admissible as to that charge, Daniels is 
neither on point nor persuasive. Moreover, the court in Daniels went on to affirm 
the trial court, noting its "sufficiently scrupulous regard for the defendant's rights," 
and thereby implicitly reaffirming the propriety of limiting instructions in relation to 
404(b) evidence. & at 11 18. 
Hoak physically battered and threatened Kathy's well-being over a period 
of several months, continuing to do so despite the existence of a no contact order 
i and even after Kathy broke up with him. This history, including the fact that Hoak 
had been undeterred by incarceration and the issuance of a no contact order, 
was highly probative and necessary to provide context for why Hoak's stalking 
behavior caused Kathy emotional distress, and why that distress was 
I 
reasonable. Any prejudice that may have flowed from the admission of this 
evidence was by no means unfair, much less sufficient to substantially outweigh 
the probative value of the evidence. Hoak has failed to establish otherwi~e.~ 
Because there was no error in this case, there is no need to engage in a 
harmless error analysis. However, the state notes the inconsistency between 
Hoak's argument that the error was not harmless because, he claims, "the State 
offered very little evidence such that a jury could have found him guilty of felony 
stalking" since the "only successful 'communications' with Ms. Hendricks 
occurred when Ms. Hendricks voluntarily obtained letters Mr. Hoak sent to a third 
party" (Appellant's Brief, p.17), and his assertion that the state should not have 
been permitted to introduce any of Hoak's prior bad acts "when viewed in 
conjunction with the possible evidence the jury could have properly considered in 
finding Mr. Hoak guilty of felony stalking." (Appellant's Brief, p.12.) 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm Hoak's convictions. 
DATED this 28'h day of January 2009. 
n 
J~$SICA M. LORELLO L but^ Attorney General 
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